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Abstract
In many countries, collectively financed health insurance systems or health
services delivery systems (such as the NHS) exist. Typically, these institutions are
financed via general taxes or specific contributions levied on earnings. As benefits
are not dependent upon income, this implies a redistribution from high to low
earners. An exception can be found in Switzerland, where equal per-capita
contributions are used.
From a public-choice perspective it is natural to ask whether the combination of
health insurance and income redistribution leads to an expansion or a contraction
of the size of a public health care system, a question that is particularly relevant in
view of the projected rapid increase of health care costs in the next decades due
to population ageing and medical progress.
Building upon the work of Gouveia (1997) and an earlier paper by the author
(Breyer 1995) I use a simple model of direct democracy to analyze under what
circumstances income redistribution tends to expand the size of a public health
insurance system. The predictions of the model are confronted with existing
evidence from Germany and Switzerland and are used to develop hypotheses on
the future development of the systems.
JEL codes: H42, H511
1. Introduction
Switzerland and Germany represent interesting objects of comparison for
different fields of applied economic research because of the difference of their
institutions. This is especially true for Public Choice, because here the effects of
direct and representative democracy can be studied. This also holds for social policy
research, because the social security systems differ tremendously in their basic
concepts among the two countries.
First of all, in Switzerland we literally find a national health insurance: there are
almost no exceptions from compulsory membership. Secondly, the components of
redistribution are arranged very different: while the statutory pension scheme in
Germany is constructed principally as an equivalence-system, the first pillar of the old
age and survivors insurance (AHV) in Switzerland redistributes income in the vertical
direction through the income-proportional levying of contributions without a ceiling,
combined with pension payments within tight upper and lower bounds. In the national
health insurance the complete opposite is true: there are unique per-capita
contributions in Switzerland, while in Germany a vertical redistribution takes place
through contributions which depend on earnings.
Comparing the two health insurance systems from a public-choice
perspective, the question arises whether the connection with income redistribution
leads to an expansion or a limitation of the scope of services of the compulsory
insurance - a question which is of tremendous relevance in a dynamic perspective,
considering the expected rapid medical progress.
In the theory of finance the illustrated problem is described under the title
“public provision of private goods”. From a public-choice view, the most important
contributions to this literature are Besley/Coate (1991), Epple/Romano (1996),
Gouveia (1997) and Blomquist/Christiansen (1999), while the author of the present
paper presented a model in Breyer (1995), which has anticipated essential results of
Gouveia. It is the aim of this contribution to apply the general model of Gouveia to the
special institutional frameworks of Switzerland and Germany and to analyze
comparatively how the existence or the lack of redistributive components will affect
the extent of coverage in a compulsory insurance system.2
Through this, the question can be answered whether the separation of the
income redistribution from the national health system and the shift to the tax transfer
system means a Pareto-improvement. It should be emphasized that the differences
in the political systems are not taken into account in our analysis. Our model can be
interpreted alternatively as a direct democracy or as a representative two-party
system with majority voting.
In Section 2 the assumptions of the model of Gouveia are presented and
applied to the specific way of contribution-levying in Germany and Switzerland. For
simplification some specificities of the German system such as the existence of an
income ceiling and other categorical exemptions from compulsory membership will
be disregarded. Section 3 analyses the political decision on the level of insurance
coverage in the compulsory insurance under the assumption that private
supplementary insurance is allowed and available in the market at fair prices. Section
4 introduces adverse selection into the model. In Section 5 testable hypotheses
about the extent of each scope of services will be developed from the comparison of
the model results and first empirical evidences will be presented. Section 6 deals with
the normative question whether the two institutional frameworks are Pareto-
comparable, and Section 6 contains final remarks.
2. The model
Gouveia (1997) considers a continuum of individuals who can differ in two
characteristics: their market income  y  and their probability of falling ill,  p . Both
characteristics are exogenous and observable, i.e. incentive effects of taxation on
earnings as well as moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance are all ignored.
The common (continuous) distribution function of both parameters, F , is defined on
the Cartesian product of the income-interval Y  and the (unit)-interval of the
probability of falling ill, P .
There are only two homogeneous goods, medical care and (general)
consumption, whose consumed quantities are labelled h and c, respectively. The
quantity  h additively consists of the state provided quantity g , and the private
additional purchase m . Both goods are traded in the world-market, and therefore3
their price-ratio (quantity of consumption goods per unit of medical care) is
exogenous and will be denoted by the symbol γ .
The utility of each consumer consists additively of the partial utility function
) (c u , which is increasing and concave in consumption, and the partial utility function
) (h v , which is increasing and concave in the quantity of medical care, where the
latter is only relevant in the state of illness. His expected utility therefore is
) ( ) ( h v p c u ⋅ + .
Private health insurance contracts provide a lump-sum payment in the case of
illness for an actuarially fair premium, i.e. the individual can secure itself the
insurance benefit I  for an insurance premium of  I p⋅ . The national health insurance
in contrast shall be identified as an in-kind benefit system: each patient gets the
same quantity of medical care, g . It is financed by an income tax with a tax schedule
) (y τ , while a risk rating does not take place. As special cases of the general tax
schedule  ) (y τ  we obtain for the two polar cases Switzerland (superscript s) and
Germany (d ):
(1)  ; ) ( α τ = y s , ) ( y y d ⋅ = β τ
furthermore the ratio between the individual contribution and the contribution on
average of the population shall amount to:
(2) ; 1 ) ( = y ts y y y td = ) (
If 
_
p  denotes the mean of the risk of illness and 
_
y  denotes  average income of
the population, it follows from the two alternative budget constraints of the state:
(3) y p g ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ = β γ α
The relative (tax-) price of an individual with characteristics ( y p, ) for one unit
of social health insurance coverage amounts to
(4) p p y t y p T j j ⋅ = ) ( ) , ( ). , ( d s j =4
3. The political equilibrium
In the following we consider the case that markets for private additional
insurances are allowed. This case is realistic, because the individuals could override
a possible prohibition, e.g. through purchasing an insurance contract in a foreign
country. We follow Gouveia (1997, S. 226) and first determine the demand for private
insurance as well as for medical care in case of illness for the case that the state
provided service quantity is zero. As the insurance is available at fair conditions, full
insurance is demanded and in case of illness the treatment quantity h is bought,
which satisfies the marginal condition
(5) ) ( ’ ) ( ’ h p y u h v ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ = γ γ .
The solution of (5) defines the demand function  ) , ; ( p y H γ .
In the next step Gouveia solves for the optimal size of state provision of
services from the perspective of an individual with characteristics ( p y, ) and he
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The economic intuition of (6) is straightforward: Individuals with a tax-price greater
than 1 receive private insurance coverage more cheaply than the public one and
therefore vote against state provision. Individuals with a tax price smaller than 1 profit
from the implicit redistribution connected with the state provision and therefore vote
for the extent of the state system which they would buy in the private market, if there
was no state provision, but they were confronted with the implicit price  γ ⋅ ) , ( y p T j  of
the state system for each unit of medical care.
Equation (6) defines a distribution of the public provision levels desired by the
voters, which of course depends on the distribution of the characteristics and the
distribution of the tax-prices. If we assume a direct democracy, the political
equilibrium is defined by the median of the distribution of the  * g -values. In the
following, it has to be analysed for each of the two institutional settings if propositions5
about the position of the median are possible. In particular it has to be asked whether
a majority of the voters demands a positive level of state provision of health services.
3.1 Income-proportional contributions
Taking into account equations (2) and (4), the relative tax-price of an individual
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i.e. the relative tax-price is the ratio of the relative income and the relative illness-risk
(each with respect to the average value). General propositions on the distribution of
the relative prices are only possible if we know the joint distribution of the
characteristics.
In the special case of identical probability of illness, the denominator of (7) is
equal to 1, and the tax price is identical to the relative income. This is typically
smaller than 1 for a broad majority of the population, from which would follow that a
majority favours a provision of state services.
In the opposite case of heterogeneous risks of illness, general propositions on
the preferences of the median voter are difficult to obtain because in this case the
covariance between the variables  p  and  y  becomes important.
3.2 Lump sum contributions
In the Swiss system of contribution assessment for the relative tax price holds:
(8)
p p
p p y t y p T s s 1
) ( ) , ( = ⋅ =
i.e. the tax price is smaller than 1 for those whose risk of illness is greater than the
population average; in other words for the above-average risks.
If we consider the distribution of the illness-risks in the population and
measure them not only by the probability of falling ill at all, but by the expected costs
of illness, it is therefore plausible, that those – similar to income – are distributed with
positive skewness. In any event, empirical observations on the distribution of6
premiums in private health insurance show that regularly only a minority of not more
than 30 per cent of all applicants have to pay a surcharge on the standard premium.
Such a distribution of illness-risks means that a majority of voters is confronted
with a relative tax-price higher than 1 and therefore refuses a state provision of
health services. The political equilibrium of the Swiss system of contribution levying
would therefore be characterised by a non-existence of a national health insurance.
4. Introducing adverse selection into the model
So far, the result of the analysis of the model is quite amazing: if the
contributions to the financing of the state provided health services are levied in terms
of a linear income tax, a positive level of state provision will be chosen in political
equilibrium. In contrast, if the contributions have the shape of a uniform per-capita
tax, the equilibrium quantity is zero.
This is essentially due to the fact that Gouveia assumes the absence of
asymmetric information. The result changes when we take into account the existence
of adverse selection. This already becomes clear in a simple model with only two
values of probability of illness,  h p  and  ) ( l h l p p p > : if the membership to a risk-
group can not be observed by an insurer, in absence of a state compulsory insurance
a pooling equilibrium does not exist in the market for private insurance contracts of
the price-quantity-type because of the single-crossing-property (cf. Rothschild/Stiglitz
1976). A separating equilibrium only exists if the share of the high risks is not too
small. If it exists, the low risks receive only such a thin insurance coverage that it is
not worth-while for a high risk to pretend to be a low risk and demand the
corresponding contract despite the relatively small premium, and they obtain a full-
insurance contract with conditions that imply zero profits for the insurer.
These circumstances are presented in Figure 1, which is adapted from
Eckstein et al. (1985). Here, point P  denotes the consumption vector of the
individual in both states of nature (superscript k=sick, g=healthy), provided that he
has no insurance coverage. The straight line PQ  symbolises the set of all
consumption vectors  ) , ( k
h
g
h c c  which can be reached through contracts which are
actuarially fair for high risks and the line PT  has an analogous interpretation for low7
risks (subscript l). The indifference curves of both types of individuals are labelled
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Figure 1: Pareto-improvement through mandatory insurance8
As an insurer can not observe the membership of an individual in one group,
each contract has to be offered to both types of demanders and has to satisfy the
condition of a non-negative profit for the actual composition of the demanders. In this
sense, all contracts which satisfy the condition of zero-profitability must lie on line
PS , if they are bought by all citizens.
Eckstein et al. (1985) show that in such a situation only a separating
equilibrium exists, in which all high risks buy full insurance coverage (point Q) and all
low risks are offered a contract on their zero-profitability-line, which is just not
interesting for the high risks (point E ).
On the basis of Figure 1 it can now be analysed under what conditions a
Pareto-improvement is possible through introduction of a compulsory public
insurance, compared to this separating equilibrium. Because of the compulsory
character a budget-balancing public insurance has to fulfil the actuarial equivalence
condition for the whole population and therefore has to be characterized by a point
on the line PS , e.g. point  X .
If purchase of private supplementary insurances is allowed, point  X
represents the new endowment for both risk types, from which the budget constraints
for actuarially equivalent contracts start, that are parallel to the lines PQ  and PT
respectively. High risks reach point G  through such a private supplementary
insurance.
For the same reason as above (absence of a state compulsory insurance) a
private complementary insurance on the line  XC  only below and to the right of point
H , which lies on the same indifference curve for high risks as point G , is now valid
for low risks. If point H , as drawn in Figure 1, lies on a higher indifference curve for
low risks than point E , state compulsion brings about a Pareto-improvement.
The economic intuition underlying the Pareto-improvement is the following:
high risks benefit from the fact that for the compulsory part of the insurance –
symbolised by the distance PX   – a uniform rate is calculated so that they are
subsidized by the low risks. Low risks now pay a higher premium for the compulsory
part of the insurance than the equivalent one; but on the other hand they can now
buy the additional amount  XH  privately, without the conditions being spoiled through
the sale of the same insurance to the high risks. The total extent of their insurance9
coverage therefore rises from PE  to PH . This effect can compensate for the
deterioration of the total price if they are sufficiently risk averse.
5. Empirical examination of the results of the model
A comparison of the health insurance systems in Switzerland and Germany
seems to confirm the theoretical results derived above: in 1998, the expenditures of
the “Compulsory Health Care Insurance” (OKPV) in Switzerland amounted to 11.9
billion CHF, to which 5.9 bio. CHF (1996) of the national hospital-financing have to be
added. Altogether 17.8 billion CHF or 4.7 per cent of the GDP of Switzerland account
for the collectively financed health services.
1
The corresponding figures for the “Statutory Sickness Funds” (GKV) in
Germany are in the same year: expenditures of 234.1 bio. DEM or 6.2 per cent of
GDP. There it is not taken into account that the German GKV only insures about 90
per cent of the resident population. According to the OECD definition, the GDP-share
of the social expenditures for health amounted 1995 to 6.6 per cent in Switzerland
and 8.1 per cent in Germany, which leads to the same conclusions with respect to
the difference between both countries.
We can find similar results, if we do not compare the total expenditure – which
can be biased through different relative prices – but the scope of insurance coverage.
Here it is obvious that in Switzerland the scope of services is much less
encompassing than in Germany: dental treatments are not covered except in
connection with a severe general illness and for all other services higher copayments
are required than in Germany: while in Germany only pharmaceuticals and similar
services fall in the category of compulsory copayments, in Switzerland there exists a
yearly deductible of 230 CHF for adults as well as a linear coinsurance of 10 per cent
up to 600 CHF per year, for all insured.
Furthermore one third of the insured make use of the possibility to reduce the
insurance premium by up to 40 per cent through opting for a higher yearly deductible
of up to 1.500 CHF (cf. Bezzola/Martinsson 1997). Because these individuals will be
                                                
1 see the website of the “Bundesamt für die Sozialversicherung”: www.bsv.admin.ch/statistik
for data for Switzerland and for Germany: BMA, (2000)10
the lower risks, this leads to an additional element of limiting the redistribution from
the low to the high illness-risks.
Beside this examination of past or present empirical observations, testable
hypotheses on the future development of the systems can be deduced. Just in the
health insurance a high growth-potential for expenditures exists because of the rapid
medical progress and the aging of the population ( cf. to the prognoses for Germany:
Breyer/Ulrich 2000). The question arises how the political systems can cope with this
development: to which extent will they tolerate a growth of the contribution rates, and
how far will limitations of the scope of services occur? The politico-economic model
of Sections 2 and 3 suggests that Switzerland will make use of the possibility to cut
the scope of services to a higher degree than Germany, where the income-
redistribution connected with the levying of contributions helps stabilizing the system
on the political level.
6. Transition problems
Tax-financed health-insurance-systems are sometimes criticised with the
argument that the redistributive procedures linked with the financing nurtured
financial illusions and led to less rational decisions on the extent of services. In a vote
about the introduction of coinsurance regulations e.g., the better off would have a
biased incentive to vote for coinsurance, because they would profit from the spending
cuts to a disproportional extent. Conversely members with below-average income
would have a biased incentive to vote against coinsurance, because they would
participate in the savings to a lesser extent.
2 Thus it is argued that a shifting of the
pure income redistribution component to the tax-transfer-system would strengthen
the rationality of the decision about the scope of services in the health insurance and
could therefore lead to a Pareto-improvement.
In the light of the theoretical results of the model of Section 3 this proposition
must now be questioned: the separation of income redistribution from the social
health insurance system shifts also the political weights towards a decrease of the
scope of services of the national health insurance. Therefore the implicit
redistribution between high and low illness risks will necessarily be reduced and high
                                                
2 Like the author of the present contribution in Breyer/Haufler (2000)11
risks will be worse off. Moreover the presumption that in such a system the
individuals would vote on coinsurance features only according to efficiency
considerations is misguided because there is still a redistributive effect (namely the
one between the different risk groups), which biases the decision.
7. Concluding Remarks
Switzerland and Germany generate an extremely suitable pair of countries for
studying the effects of different political and institutional systems on the formation
and extent of contribution-financed compulsory social insurance schemes. For the
case of social health insurance it turns out that in absence of pure income-
redistribution through the system (i.e. in Switzerland), only the presence of adverse
selection is suitable to explain that this branch of the social insurance system found
political acceptance in the first place. What it is less surprising is that the extent of the
insurance benefits is significantly smaller than in the German national health
insurance. With regard to the future technological and demographic developments
we predict a widening of the disparities between the two health-insurance-systems,
concerning their share of the Gross Domestic Product.12
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